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Democrats need to do better with white voters part 3

by Eric Ferguson on March 4, 2013

I hadn’t planned on getting to a “part 3″, but neither is it surprising that this turns out to be a large subject. It’s counter-intuitive to say Democrats need to win more white voters when so much discussion is about the shrinking white majority and the nation’s growing demographic groups (growing as a portion of the population — they’re all growing in absolute numbers) being Democratic-leaning. In the first part I addressed why we need to do better and summarized in part two, so the even briefer version, we need more whites because the presidential margin was thin and we’re losing too many districts to win majorities. The second part was an overview of the variables we’re working with. One of those variables is population density, which, while trying to be brief, I explained was so important and more complex than could be dealt with briefly, that I planned a future post on it. Here we are.

 

And here’s that chart which, judging from the fact this is the third or fourth post where I’ve used it, I must like a lot.

 

Source: Ezra Klein’s Wonkblog, “2012 The Year in Graphs”

 

There in one chart is a trend most readers have probably seen in maps showing even blue states looking all red with spots of blue, or inferred when noticing which presidential candidate won which states. Mostly for the benefit of those who can’t see the chart, the density of a precinct made little difference from the sparsest precincts until what looks like about 300 people per square mile. Romney had a large lead over Obama. There’s a crossover around 800, and then a massive Obama advantage in more densely populated areas. Though it measures just the presidential race, when looking at who won which congressional districts, it seems clear the chart would look the same. Legislative maps tend to have the same look of blue islands in a red sea.

 

Is density the real problem, and not race? Do whites vote equally Republican regardless of where they live, and Democratic-leaning demographic groups (DLDGs) equally Democratic regardless of where they live? Given how whites in urban areas I’m familiar with tend to vote Democratic (admittedly not a scientific sample, but what I have for now), I’m thinking density rather than race is the key, except that begs the question of whether DLDGs vote as Democratic in rural areas as they do in cities (keep in mind DLDGs aren’t just non-white, but can include young people, non-religious, etc.) Again, the instances of rural DLDGs I know of, not an exhaustive survey, vote Democratic like in urban areas. So looks like neither race nor density is determinative — but yet there’s that graph. Maybe DLDGs in rural areas vote Democratic, but there aren’t enough of them to make much difference, while whites in urban areas have come to vote more Democratic like other urbanites. That crossover at 800 people per square mile certainly suggests density is itself a factor.

 

Being aware that correlation doesn’t equal causation, we don’t just assume density makes people liberal or sparsity makes people conservative — though we don’t rule that out either. Maybe some personality traits cause people to prefer aspects of urban life, and to tend toward liberalism. Maybe some personality traits lead people to prefer small town and rural life, and to prefer conservatism. Another possibility is people are self-selecting. I doubt more than a tiny portion of the population would pick where they live according to the party likely to win the local elections, but maybe they’re moving to be with people who are more like themselves.

 

Essentially, we’re looking at something important, but cause and effect are not obvious. So we’re looking at possibilities and likelihoods, and at some point, what can we do with the information?

 

Let’s start with the explanation for this correlation that strikes me as easiest to dismiss, that people have self-selected according to political inclinations. Politically active people might let party or ideology be a factor in where they choose to live, but most people aren’t that engaged and don’t have a strong party identification, and maybe don’t even know what “ideology” means. In this article from The New York Times Magazine about how the parties have adapted to changing circumstances, there was a lengthy section about a Republican pollster asking focus groups about impressions of the two parties. It was striking how the groups thought of themselves generally as conservatives, yet generally agreed with liberal attitudes and positions on current issues. The words they associated with each party were mostly positive about Democrats and negative about Republicans. I speculate that the only reason they think of themselves as conservative is the decades-long successful demonization of the word “liberal”, and no pollster has to my knowledge ever used the word “progressive”. Even among political activists, I’ve seen surprise when shown electoral maps of a state divided by county or legislative district. That’s anecdotal, but if even activists couldn’t have predicted what the map of election results would look like in their own state, I have trouble believing the average voter has any awareness of it at all.

 

In short, I’m just not seeing any evidence people are choosing where they live based on politics, and there seem to be stronger explanations.

 

So is there something in some people’s personalities that make them prefer greater density — and liberal politics? Conversely, some people might have personalities that make them prefer more sparse areas — and conservative politics. Regular readers of liberal blogs have probably come across research on differences between liberal and conservative personalities, and even different brain activity. The author of The Republican Brain, Chris Mooney, recently wrote this article on liberals and conservatives having different preferences as consumers. Essentially, conservatives are inclined to stick with the same brands they’ve been used to, while liberals are more likely to try something unfamiliar. Marketers have learned to try new brands first in liberal areas. Is there a political connection to certain brands? Sometimes, but there’s usually no explicit connection. It seems to be a personality trait that makes people more open to trying new brands and more liberal in their politics. It seems to fit with the idea that a defining difference between liberals and conservatives is their attitude toward change, where liberals drive it, conservatives resist it.

 

If personality is driving people, then maybe it’s a matter of people who prefer conservative politics also prefer the aspects of life in sparsely populated areas, while other people find themselves drawn to the aspects of life in densely populated areas and, by coincidence, to liberal politics. Perhaps the people living in those areas with the 800 people per square mile, the crossover between Obama and Romney, aren’t just divided fairly evenly between liberals and conservatives, but actually have personalities that make them prefer that level of density and, by coincidence, more centrist politics. This is even before muddying the waters with the other reasons people live where they do, like being near preferred schools or their job, remaining near family, needing mass transit, being unable to sell their house, etc.

 

What if it’s the other way around however, meaning that the correlation isn’t coincidence, but density makes people liberal and lack of it makes people conservative. We can’t just shift people around for a political science experiment. We do however know from our history that change has almost always been driven from our cities. It’s hard to boil all history down to data points, but looking at other cultures and times, the fact of change being driven by densely populated areas and resisted in sparsely populated areas seems like a constant. That’s counting only internal change, not change enforced on a culture from outside. Being forced to make best guesses from limited information, I think it’s both, and I suspect a feedback is going on that’s driving the stronger partisanship we’ve seen in recent decades. In other words, political preferences are being driven by personality traits that also make people prefer certain densities, but density does affect personality at the same time, with more pushing people towards liberalism and less pushing towards conservatism.

 

The why do we have conservatives in cities and liberals in some rural areas? Besides whatever is going on the lives of individuals, we’re looking at tendencies, not rules. Remember in this series we’re thinking about winning more white votes, and race is a huge factor in American politics. The idea that urban whites are a bunch of liberals would probably have sounded delusional to non-whites fighting segregation during the civil rights movement, yet looking at it from the present, it seems even during that era, white liberals concentrated in cities. White conservatives left cities for suburbs. Likewise, those rural areas that are predominantly non-white (like Indian reservations or the Southeastern “black belt”) tend to be as Democratic as non-white urban areas or non-white suburbs. So it seems whites vary their politics by density, but non-whites don’t.

 

Those are multiple possibilities and considerable uncertainty. All we still know for sure is Democrats are winning where populations are dense, and losing where they’re sparse, with exceptions, but the trend only holds up for whites, not for non-whites. Can we apply this to anything useful, like winning elections?

 

Yes we can. Something jumps out immediately, namely, use density to identify winnable districts. We do that already by looking at results from prior elections, but that seems a bit like trying to understand what happened in a game by looking at the final score. That tells us the result, but not how it came to be. Assuming anything around the 800 people per square mile crossing point should be winnable, that anything to the left on the chart should be red, and anything to the right should be blue, we can probably find election results that don’t match expectations. Maybe the difference is the demographic mix, or an entrenched incumbent defies other factors, or an incumbent had a scandal but stayed in the race, or one local party is much stronger than the other. So use density as an independent factor, apart from recent election results or partisan voting indexes or income or anything else to identify winnable districts, and hopefully find districts we’ve overlooked.

 

That doesn’t of course get us to solving the problem of winning where, right now, we don’t and shouldn’t. We need to figure out if the exceptions have something unique going on, or something that can be replicated elsewhere, so we can do better where demographics and population density say we should lose. By “better”, I don’t mean just scratching out some more blue votes in red areas to win statewide races, but winning enough districts to win majorities of seats.

 

So now that we’ve established the why and the overview of winning more while votes, it’s time to dig into the how. Looks like the post that turned into a trilogy is going to have to become a … what’s the word like “trilogy” for something with four parts?

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Democrats need to do better with white voters part 2

by Eric Ferguson on February 4, 2013

UPDATE: a commenter came up with another variable

Last December I wrote about, counter-intuitive as it might sound given what Republicans are going through, why Democrats need to win a bigger share of the white vote. This follow-up is getting into how to win more white votes, but given that a month has passed since the first post, here’s the short version of why:

  • Considering presidential elections, Obama won only narrowly, and improving on Obama’s 39% of the white vote by even a few percent provides a margin of error in case Republicans have some success reaching out to what we might lump together as Democratic-leaning demographic groups (DLDGs). Succeeding at such an improvement in the popular vote will probably have some effect on the electoral college too.
  • We’re losing the majority of congressional and legislative districts despite winning the popular majority (that’s the case in the US House, and though I don’t know about state legislative races collectively, it’s true in enough states that I feel safe saying that). Our huge lead among DLDGs isn’t translating into seats. If we can’t improve among whites, we can’t win the US House, nor most legislative chambers.
  • Why do I feel so sure we can do this, improving on Obama’s 39% a few points to, say, 43%? In 2008, Obama’s share of the white vote was — 43%. That would seem to be definitive proof we can do this.

    Since figuring out how to win more of the white vote is an overambitious undertaking for a blog post, let’s just start with identifying the variables of our task. At least then we can start with some sense of the scope of the problem and where to start actually working on it, and the first variable that comes to mind is the exceptions.

    Exceptions: OK, maybe it seems obvious there will be always be exceptions to any trend, problem, guideline, whatever, that we come up with, but sometimes we need to stop and look at exceptions to see if they really are unique, or if they tell us something. For example, in the first post, I included  this graph showing how Obama won heavily in the most densely populated precincts, but Romney won where the population is sparse:

    One of the whitest and sparsest states is Vermont — where Democrats win easily.  
    Did Vermont Democrats get lucky, or do something pretty smart, or some combination? I don’t know nearly enough to speculate, but I do know Vermont proves that areas that are white and sparse can be won, and I know it’s worth looking into how it happens there.

    For an example I know better, Northeast Minnesota is also white and sparse, and has long been a Democratic stronghold. The area isn’t as agricultural as other rural areas of the state, and the workforce is heavily unionized. Could that be the difference? We know union members vote about two-thirds Democratic. I’ve never seen union members broken out by demographics, so I’m going to make an educated guess that white union members vote more Democratic than white non-union members. Does that suggest anything to us? A couple things. One, white union members might be a place to start looking for white votes. Two, organizing more workers might lead to more of them voting Democratic.

    Union membership: So there’s a variable to consider, union membership. I’m sure every good Democrat is thinking organizing more workers is screamingly obvious and not exactly an insight. Sometimes the obvious still needs to be checked in case there’s something we overlooked, like just how many white union members are voting Republican? Why are the one-third of union members who vote Republican voting for a party that wants them to stop existing? Organizing is tough and long term, but short-term, is there someplace where we’re leaving votes on the metaphorical table?

    Density: Next, let’s get back to density and see if that graph above tells us anything. Asking whether density causes people to vote a certain way, or people who vote a certain way prefer the attributes of particular densities, or people are self-selecting somehow, got complicated. In fact, this section got so long as I was writing it that I cut it out and started a separate post, hopefully to be completed in the near future.

    Even struggling for brevity, it seems worth pointing out that the graph matches the results we see in congressional and legislative elections. Democratic districts look like little blue dots on a red map almost right across the country. That, besides how many pixels it’s taking me to say what I have to say, is why I’m going to try to give density its own post. For now, I’ll just say that whether population density causes people to hold certain political views, whether choosing political preferences and choosing where to live happen to come from the same personality traits but don’t cause each other, or whether some sort of self-selection is going on, makes a huge differences in the next questions we ask and the approaches we take. I hate giving a conclusion with little about how I got there, but nonetheless, I’m inclined to think aspects of living in different densities lead people to certain political tendencies. Whites in urban areas should be the most winnable, but also most likely already won, and they help only to win statewide — not that winning statewide is pointless. Ask anyone living under a GOP ideologue governor elected in 2010. But we have to crack the problem of winning more sparsely populated areas to win majorities of seats, and that graph might suggest looking at districts around 800 people per square mile.

    Region: By “region” I mean states, not urban, suburban, and rural differences. Obama’s 39% of the white vote was just 10% in some states, but he won the white vote in other states, and even the white male vote in a few. So the problem is not uniform across the country, and the course of action is not obvious. Does getting only 10% in some states mean that’s where we have to go for more votes? Are the states where we’re doing the best also the states where potential voters are most persuadable and that’s the opportunity? It strikes me when looking at the whole country that we need a balance of both where the opportunity is greatest, and where the strategic need is greatest. On the one hand, referring again to Vermont, Democrats already win districts, so maybe that’s the best place to find persuadable white voters, but the impact is low. On the other hand, there’s Texas.

    Texas isn’t just the second biggest prize of electoral college votes and it isn’t just safely Republican; it’s a must-win for Republicans. Without it, they have no realistic path to the presidency (barring finding some way to muck around with the electoral college — not to give them ideas, but I’m amazed they haven’t suggested just letting the Republican state legislatures assign their states’ votes to the Republican candidate regardless of popular vote, which would be perfectly constitutional). They also get two safe US Senate seats without which their hopes of taking the Senate grow dim, and the gerrymandering of congressional districts is much of their House majority. The latter absolutely requires they hold the governor and state legislature. If Democrats could make Texas competitive, that would be a national gamechanger. Republicans would be forced to pour resources into Texas instead of using it as a piggy bank even if Democrats merely gave them a good scare. Forget about waiting for demographic changes to just happen, taking the risk a big enough percentage of DLDGs will vote Republican to keep the state red. Trying to win over enough current voters might make Texas purple an election or two sooner. It’s an uphill climb certainly, but strategically, it has the biggest payoff.

    But should more winnable situations with much less payoff be ignored if we’re in an either/or situation? Well, good thing we’re supposed to be the ones who cope better with nuance.

    Religion: The takeover of the Republican Party by Christian conservatives has set up something of a feedback loop. Being Republican became identified as part of being Christian, and being Christian is part of being Republican. Liberal Christians might not agree with the need to be Republican and conservative to be Christian, but conservative Christians and Republicans seem to think those things go together, and they get to decide who joins the GOP. Non-Christians and liberal Christians are among the DLDGs, even if by virtue of being pushed out of the Republican Party rather than choosing to join the Democrats. Well, so be it. The fact Christians are still a majority of all Americans, and a majority of whites, suggests that we have to win over more white Christians, even if they’re shrinking as a portion of the population. People with no religious affiliation vote Democratic already, but they’re the fastest growing group, so there might still be plenty of opportunity there. If it turns out they’re concentrated in heavily Democratic districts already, then we still have no alternative to trying to win more Christian votes, but one thing needs to be made explicitly clear: I do not mean to imply Democrats have to start making religious appeals for votes, but rather, trying to win the votes of voters who happen to be Christians. I wouldn’t for a moment suggest that non-Christians pretend to be Christians, but I am suggesting the non-Christian vote isn’t enough in most districts, and where it is enough, those are usually safely blue districts already.

    Gender: Since white women are more likely to vote Democratic than white men, maybe the place to look for votes is obvious. Keep in mind though that the gender gap doesn’t just mean women lean Democratic. It means men lean Republican. Sometimes, the gender gap has helped Republicans. So do we go for women’s votes since that’s been a better place to look so far, or should we seek a way to close up the gap on the male side?

    Occupations: People in some occupations are among the DLDGs even when they’re mostly white, like scientists, government workers, teachers, and artists, and I presume readers have already noticed something they all have in common: conservatives hate them. I suggest they’re Democrats more because Republicans pushed them away than because they suddenly turned liberal, though I suppose being hated by conservatives would lead you to consider whether liberals are really so bad. Blue collar whites used to be a strongly Democratic group, and the fact they aren’t is still hard for Democrats to wrap our heads around. If we could figure out how to win back blue collar whites, that’s a lot of the GOP base gone. Doing so is clearly a big topic, so for now I’ll just admit that what we’re doing isn’t working well enough.

    Age:The Democratic lead among younger voters is partly due to younger voters being less white than older voters. Among younger whites, we’re still losing, just by less than among older whites. Then again, we need just a bigger minority of whites, not a majority, so that still works for us. On the other hand, do we need to give up on older whites? For example, the photo ID for voting constitutional amendment in Minnesota failed as badly among senior citizens as other age groups. This was an amendment rather than candidate, but still, among older white voters, the Democratic position won (our older voters are so heavily white that I feel safe saying that). So it can be done.

    Income: I haven’t seen a cross-tabs of different income groups and race or ethnicity. As I started thinking about differences in income, I realized I’ve got nothing but guesses and presumptions. It seems worth asking though if rich whites vote differently than middle class or poor whites. Does each income group vote the same way regardless of where they live, and what other groups they fall into? If I had to guess, I would guess income isn’t predictive of much of anything. I don’t like guessing though, so best to look.

    Multiple variables: A white male is actually a member of two demographic groups. A suburban white male is in three groups. A young suburban white male … it’s probably obvious where I’m going, and probably the point is obvious. Just remember that when you’re trying to step back and rethink what you’re doing, you have to check the obvious too just in case you’ve actually been forgetting it. So multiple variables is a complication without a magic formula. The message or policy that we hope wins over the young suburban white male might have a strong appeal to suburbanites, but then young people hate it. I have no solution to offer except to be sensible that this is what we’re dealing with. In fact, rather than assuming undecided voters are oblivious people who somehow missed an election campaign that dominated the news for year, they could be undecided because the suburban part of their identity likes what we have to say, but the young part prefers the Republican position. In other words, an individual could be experiencing conflicting values or conflicting interests, even while being informed, and thus gets to election day unable to decide. That might explain why the Obama campaign broke down their targets for TV ads to such discrete units.

    Where you live: How is where each of us lives a variable in winning the white vote? While we’re discussing the macro view, and we can try to encourage those in a position to actually make strategic decisions to do one thing or the other, at a local level, we can do more than just share a link on Facebook or recommend a diary on Kos. We can become the person making decisions. Sometimes the trick is jut showing up. Even when you’re looking just at your own time, we have our biggest impact at home. By time I mean we can travel to volunteer elsewhere, but you can only help with a campaign that way. You can’t stay and build something like you can at home. So I’m hardly going to blame someone who devotes their time to the safe district that helps not at all to win swing districts, if the safe district is where they live. When we try to influence the people who run statewide campaigns or statewide parties, we’re thinking at a large level. When you have three hours free next Thursday, you help at home. And that’s fine. Nobody knocking doors in their own district should be made to feel like they’re wasting their time, and you’re certainly not wasting time building a local party or advocacy group where you live and therefore can keep at it. At the same time, our overall topic is winning more white voters so we can win more districts in a situation where Democrats are packed and maybe even gerrymandered. So to the extent each person has flexibility, just consider that. Maybe you live in a safe district but just over the line from a swing district. That might allow you to not just show up once or twice, but to be a volunteer who can be around for years.

    It also shows the importance of local party building. If local parties are built in safe districts only, that doesn’t help. It means in every other district, each campaign requires reinventing the wheel. That’s short term thinking. If you do happen to be living in a red or purple district, I encourage you to focus on building the local party, hopefully building up an experienced group and broadening the base of volunteers. Be the 50-state strategy. So I guess as well as saying think local, I’m also saying think long term.

    UPDATE:
    Thanks to a commenter on the cross-post on Daily Kos pointing out another variable, which is media. Maybe it’s actually an aspect of density, but media availability might actually be a variable by itself. Urban and suburban areas usually have a bunch of local TV stations, full radio dials, ready access to broadband, and large dailies and alternative weekly newspapers, while some parts of the country still have no broadband, and dial-up works fro not much of the modern internet. Many cable systems don’t carry MSNBC let alone Current/Al Jazeera, but they all carry Fox News. There are few local TV channels in many places, and even few radio stations, and nothing liberal. Even some big cities have no liberal radio, not the terrestrial radio is as important as it used to be, but it’s far from nothing … and everybody gets conservative radio. Good luck getting alternative weeklies much outside the urban core. So in short, people can vary widely in terms of the available media.

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    Why The Republicans Control US House

    by Curmudgeon on January 5, 2013

    An observation from my farm days. Why does a dog lick his balls? Because he can! Why do the looney tunes in the US Congress spread their hate and vitriol and continually press to harm the poor, disabled and elderly? Why do they ignore their constitutional obligations and pursue their book of treasonous actions?  Because they can!

    The Republicans stole another election by gerrymandering a bunch of congressional districts so that the wing nut incumbent can’t be defeated. In fact, in the 2012 House election the voters of the United States cast 1,362,351 more votes for Democratic candidates than Republicans. We won the House! Not quite. The full percentage point was not even close. To elect a controlling majority, it would have taken a Democratic margin of 7.25 percentage points!

    This gang stands fast against:
    Social Security
    Medicare
    Evolution
    Climate change
    Science
    Woman’s health
    Public schools
    Pentagon cuts
    Any taxes on the wealthy
    Health care
    Obama

    They control the heartbeat of the House. As bad as Boehner is, the real threats to his leadership are from the far right, the non beatable members. This smelly crew are remnants of the Republicans who tried to kill Social Security ever since 1939 and stop Medicare since 1965; they get hysterical about “Obamacare.” They have no concern for the wellbeing of the country.
    Our own Michele Bachmann introduced the first bill of the 113th Congress, an act to repeal Obamacare, the 34th such bill introduced in the House and it continues the tradition of the do-nothing 112th Congress. Michele doesn’t enjoy an unbeatable district, but in her reality she probably thinks she can never be unelected. Perhaps these clowns can make the 113th even worse than the abysmal 112th.

    Think Progress reports, “…the incoming House bears no resemblance to the one America actually voted for. And individual Republican House members will be able to engage in this political dangerous game of chicken comfortable in the knowledge that partisan gerrymandering makes many of them untouchable in a general election.”
    (http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/01/02/1382471/thanks-to-gerrymandering-democrats-would-need-to-win-the-popular-vote-by-over-7-percent-to-take-back-the-house/)

    I have an obscene vision of Michele huddled with her buddies trying to lick her balls along with the other dogs in the pack. Maybe in her reality she can.

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    Democrats need to do better with white voters

    by Eric Ferguson on December 31, 2012

    I recognize that saying Democrats need to do better with white voters seems counter-intuitive. Didn’t Obama just prove that a Democrat can win the presidency with just 39% of the white vote? Yes. I’m likewise aware that Republicans lost badly with Democratic leaning demographic groups (rather than list them all*, or rather than use the phrase “Democratic leaning demographic groups” over and over, permit me to create an acronym, DLDGs). Normally the onus is on the losing side to figure out how to reach out to the winner’s voters, yet here I am advocating the opposite. It’s counter-intuitive enough that I’m confining this post to the why of reaching out to white voters, and leaving the how for later.

    So, why should Democrats worry about reaching out to white voters instead of just watching Republicans flailing efforts at reaching out to DLDGs? Because they might not always be flailing. Yes, my forays into conservative media have revealed disgust over having to care what DLDGs think, and some of those thinking about outreach are cluelessly stuck in their ideology. I wish I could find where I read about a month ago that the way to reach urban voters is to destroy the teachers unions — really. Personally, I’m content to leave them taking their usual approach of picking the bits of GOP platform that might have some appeal rather than rethinking their approach … or learning anything about the people who don’t vote for them. But will they remain clueless? Not all of them, and some do have a clue already. Republicans might not succeed in cutting into the Democratic lead among DLDGs, but they’re going to try, they might succeed, and they need to pick up just a few points to make up Romney’s deficit to Obama in the popular vote. If Democrats can pick up a few points among white voters, they gain a margin of error, just in case Republicans enjoy some success — and even if Republicans have no success at all, Democrats have more problems than winning the popular vote by just a few points.

    Yes I know, the presidency is decided by this archaic refugee from the 18th century, the electoral college, which didn’t make a whole lot of sense even then and makes none now, but that’s how the presidency is decided. That’s just it: we may need to do better among whites to have any hope of winning the electoral college. I’m thinking of this recent development Dan Burns wrote about recently, the blue states with Republican governments that are thinking of allocating their electoral college votes by congressional district. These are the same state governments where Republicans gerrymandered the districts to guarantee they win most of the seats despite Democrats getting most of the vote or coming very close. In Pennsylvania for example, one of the states considering this change in the electoral college, Democrats won 49% of the congressional vote but won just 5 out of 18 seats. Nationally, not only did Republicans win the majority of the House with a minority of the votes, but Mitt Romney won most districts. Instead of Obama’s roughly 5.5% win gaining him all 20 of Pennsylvania’s electoral votes, he would have gotten just seven — five for the districts he won and the two for winning statewide — while Romney would have gotten 13.

    Lest anyone think gerrymandering is just about congressional districts, just imagine Republicans doing this in every state they control.
    No, they wouldn’t do this in states that reliably vote Republican for president, but thanks to the wave of 2010, they control both houses and the governor in several blue states.

    To anticipate another question, doing this is perfectly legal. States allocate their electoral college votes however they see fit. Think back to 2000 when the Florida legislature considered ignoring the recount and awarding Florida’s votes to Bush. That would have been legal.

    No, Democrats can’t do the same thing. Even if we get past the principle that the state shouldn’t twist the rules to let the minority party win, Democrats don’t control the government in any presidentially red states, at least not right now.

    Would having this system in place in 2012 have let Romney win? It’s impossible to be sure because that would have been a different campaign. It would depend on how many voters split their tickets between Obama and the Republican congressional candidate and how they’re distributed (Obama won by about 4%, House Democrats won by about 1%), and of course on which states implement this. Just looking at Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, which are considering this reallocation, the electoral college gets very close.

    I certainly didn’t mean to imply the House of Representatives is no big deal when I said, “Lest anyone think gerrymandering is just about congressional districts…”, because it’s a very big deal. Even if I saw no way Republicans could win the electoral college in the foreseeable future, the grip Republicans have on the House is plenty of reason to worry about winning more heavily white districts. Nor is it just about Congress, because state legislatures were gerrymandered the same way, and the GOP grip on legislatures is what makes the gerrymandering possible — as well as the state-level assaults on the rights of people who tend not to vote Republican. Want to restore women’s rights or the right to organize? We’re going to have to win back state legislatures.

    Republican-friendly districting even all about gerrymandering. It’s about density. Even non-partisan redistricting has given advantages to Republicans because Democrats tend to live in more densely populated areas, resulting in the same packing as gerrymandering, just less of it. If you’re going to keep Minneapolis together in one congressional district, then you’re going to have a heavily Democratic district no matter how you draw the lines. No gerrymandering necessary. Even inner suburbs can be somewhat densely populated and they lean blue too, but outer suburbs and rural areas can be drawn lots of ways without splitting municipalities. If Wisconsin weren’t gerrymandered, the districts including Madison and Milwaukee would be heavily Democratic while Republicans would enjoy an advantage in other districts. In other words, just somehow undoing the gerrymandering wouldn’t fix the whole problem.

    So how do we fix the problem? That’s why Democrats have to win more white votes, even while the white majority shrinks; to have a hope of retaking the House, to avoid ceding a permanent advantage to the GOP in the electoral college, and to win back state legislatures. Waiting for demographic trends to aid us isn’t enough even if the GOP utterly fails to improve its share of the DLDG vote, which is not a safe assumption anyway. Undoing gerrymandering isn’t enough even if we can do it, which maybe we can’t. Unpacking Democrats seems like a long shot since people have reasons for living where they do. Care to move just to vote in a less blue district? Me neither.

    Maybe some social trend will cause people to move around in such a way as to unpack districts, but I can’t even guess at what that trend might be. The opposite seems to be true, that people are moving to areas where their own political predilections prevail — I’ve even seen it suggested that this is conscious. Even if the packing is broken up just by how people move around, it’s far enough away to be of no help to solving our immediate problem. Maybe there’s just something about high density that makes people more liberal and low density that makes them conservative, but the growth of central cities and inner suburbs, not guaranteed to happen, might be countered by exurban sprawl.

    Why go on about density? It isn’t just noticing that Democrats tend to win in central cities and inner suburbs, and by larger margins than Republicans tend to win in Republican safe districts. Have a look at this chart:

    So our problem is the need to win more sparsely populated districts. Since such districts tend to be heavily white, we need to figure out how to increase our share of white voters. I hope in a near-future post to at least start thinking through the variables.

    *Just so as not to leave out anyone who doesn’t immerse themselves in electoral politics enough to know what demographic groups are Democratic leaning, in hopes I’m leaving out nobody  — and realizing I’m leaving out nuances — such groups include blacks, Latinos, Asians, American Indians, non-Christians, students, young adults, single-women, gays, urbanites, and immigrants, with recognition there is crossover among them. Most GOP consternation is caused by losses among the groups growing as a portion of the population, especially Latinos which are the largest racial/ethnic minority, and to a lesser degree Asians. Non-Christians are growing, though I’m not sure the GOP has picked up on that yet except to stoke paranoid fear of atheists and Muslims. Young voters are a problem because, though probably they aren’t growing as a portion of the population, people establish a habit when they vote for the same party in their first several elections, and they’ve been heavily Democratic for a decade. Gays probably aren’t growing as a portion of the population, but open gays are growing as is their acceptance by straights. “Urbanization” might be broadly construed to include inner tiers of suburbs which have much in common with central cities, often including political preferences, so that even though outer suburbs tend to be Republican, the growth of cities is more advantageous to Democrats.

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    Possible vile shenanigans in blue states

    by Dan Burns on December 18, 2012

    Get a load of this crap.

    Reid Wilson at the National Journal has an extended look at a coordinated GOP scheme to rig the electoral college; even though a prominent attempt died on the vine in Pennsylvania last year, Republicans in Washington are organizing efforts in several blue-leaning states to forge ahead once again. As we’ve written before, these plans typically revolve around splitting a state’s electoral votes by congressional district, which of course is wonderful if you’re the GOP and you’ve drawn the state’s congressional map to your liking. For instance, even though Barack Obama won Michigan handily, Republican control over the mapmaking Mitt Romney prevailed in nine of the state’s 14 districts.

    Along with Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan make the most tempting targets because they’re all blue states which (temporarily, we can pray) are completely controlled by Republicans, thanks to the 2010 wipeout.

    One of the fundamental lessons of all of human history is that when a certain faction attains the heights of wealth and power, as plutocrats have in contemporary America, they’ll do anything to stay there.  Vote suppression, unlimited election spending…there’s no reason not to expect even worse.  It will only end when conservatism itself is rendered politically, economically, and socially impotent as viable ideology.  That needs to be the goal.

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    Enough already Democrats —- Don’t get cocky

    by Eric Ferguson on December 12, 2012

    There wasn’t one comment that prompted this admonition to ourselves to not get cocky about one good election. It’s more that I noticed one too many references to how great we did and how overwhelming our win was, probably when I heard the host of a national talk radio program say Obama torched Romney, with no quotation marks because I’m sure I’m only paraphrasing, but that’s pretty close. The one benefit of losing is it forces you to take a hard look at what went wrong, at least once all the denial is out of the way. Victory tends to cover up problems. It’s hard to see what you did wrong when you did whatever you did and won. Then again, this is intended to be broader than just the presidential election, so there are plenty we lost.

    Just to start a reality check, the Republican Party isn’t going to wither away, though there is certainly an opportunity to reduce it thanks to the dinosaurification of the GOP. What I meant, the short version, is we have an opportunity rather than an advantage. There is no guarantee new citizens or new young voters will lean Democratic like the new voters of recent elections. There’s no guarantee the Republicans won’t find a way to appeal to at least a larger minority of them. Since new voters tend to vote for the same party they voted for in their first few elections, we have an opportunity to build in a demographic advantage, but it’s not a given.

    I’ll add to that and point out that no matter how big a win we enjoy or how many wins, the Republican dinosaurs will survive. The structure of our government leads to the development of two parties, so even if the GOP did do its best dinosaur-post-asteroid impression, somebody would seek an alternative power structure to the Democratic Party. So the remains of the Republicans would be there to be revived. Hopefully though, they won’t be like current Republicans. Might not even be conservative.
    Speaking of conservatism, while we’re doing a reality check, don’t expect conservatism to go away. It would be nice if it gave up conspiracy theories in favor of reality, but in some form, it will be around. No matter how much conservative policies have disintegrated on contact with reality, political ideology comes to a significant degree from human psychology. So conservatism will always be with us and, sorry conservatives, liberalism will always be with you — even if one party went away. That has actually happened in fact, when the Federalist Party encouraged secessionism in New England during the War of 1812, and then the war ended with a big success and oops, no more Federalists. Everybody became a Democrat no matter what they thought. And no, it wasn’t a smoothly functioning party. They divided into factions and, surprise, organized into two parties.

    All that is really just putting a cap on optimism (or, since Republicans have been on top sometimes and will be again, a floor under pessimism). While we’re giving ourselves a reality check, we need to look at some specifics from the 2012 election.

    First off, Obama will have won by just 3.5-4% once all the ballots are counted (it’s been over a month and some states are still doing their first count, which makes me ask of opponents of election day registration, do you really prefer provisional ballots after seeing how they’re working out?). I hear some pundits saying that’s big for a presidential election, which confirms me in my opinion that some pundits are complete tossers. In any election, 3.5-4% is close. Maybe not recount-close, but certainly “we have a shot next time” close.

    Yes I know, it’s the electoral college (EC) that decides the presidency, not the popular vote, but win the popular vote by a few points and you probably win the EC. If the next Republican can get 51%  instead of 47%, he’ll probably win. So even though the Democratic candidate has won four of the last six elections, five of the last six in the popular vote (and yes, five out of six in the EC if Florida’s election had been honest, maybe six out if six if Ohio’s election had been honest), and there’s a supposed “Obama coalition” now, that’s no long-term grip on the presidency, necessarily. If the Republicans succeed in taking a few points off their deficit with non-white voters, they can win. While I expect Obama’s 39% among white voters is a floor, that could be wrong. A few more points among whites, and the Republican candidate can win. Or keep the percentages the same but improve white turnout, or get better at suppression of non-white voters, and the Republicans can win. Despite Republicans either being in denial about their problems or clueless about how to address them, they’re not that far away, in math terms anyway.

    Next, I just want to point out that Democrats didn’t win because the polls said they’d win. Maybe that reality check should be given as well to Republicans still suspecting pollster bias, but I’m more interested in us. There was a side story to the election of pundits versus nerds. The data of the Obama analysts, the non-unskewed poll aggregators, and most pollsters, was right, while the anecdotes and opinions of pundits who persistently poo-pooed them were wrong. I admit it was fun not just that they found out on election night that they got it wrong, but it was obvious they were told they were wrong all through the campaign and just wouldn’t listen (not that any of them have lost any TV time over it). The liberal netroots routed for the data to beat the punditocracy, and enjoyed mocking the poll denialism of conservatives, but let’s b clear on something: we didn’t win just because we accepted the data. The data told us about the impending doom in 2010, and getting it right didn’t help. Maybe warnings were unheeded by too many people in campaign decision making positions. Can’t tell. There was a nerd versus pundit fight in 2010 too, but I don’t think the pundits knew about it.

    I certainly think using what the data tell you rather than denying the bad news will sometimes allow us to fix mistakes in time, but let’s face it, sometimes all you get is to not be surprised on election night. If the Romney campaign had believed the data the last week, all it would have told them was they needed to work only on a speech starting with “I congratulate the president.” We don’t deserve any particular credit for trusting data that gave us good news. I do think though we can slap our own backs for not throwing Nate Silver out of the club of liberal news junkies for giving us dreadful news. I’m not sure how he became the data poster boy (I would guess other poll aggregators wonder the same thing, like TPM got it right too), but at least we didn’t treat the liberal who was right when he told liberals what they didn’t want to hear like  conservatives treat conservatives who are right when they deliver the bad news.

    Point being that while trusting the data sometimes offers a chance to fix problems, just rooting for the eventual winner in nerds versus pundits isn’t why we won, and continuing to trust the data won’t guarantee future wins.

    Switching to the Senate, the odds of holding the Senate are better in 2014 than they were in 2012, based on which party has to defend how many seats and the size of the Democratic majority. But there is still more odds-defying to be done. Democrats have to defend 20 of the 33 seats up in 2014, and the early analysis I linked to rates more Democratic seats as vulnerable. They can lose four seats and keep the outright majority (that is, without depending on the VP to break ties). That’s better than 2012, where the Democrats defended 23 of 33 and could lose only two. Still, taking the Senate is quite doable for the Republicans, and at least some have learned the folly of nominating fools and crazies. Good news, looks like it reverses in 2016, when the Republicans have to defend probably 22 seats.

    Next, and a case could be made that this is the biggest reality check for us, we were unable to take back the US House despite winning most of the votes. It’s not a huge popular vote margin and it was enough to flip a few seats, but the Republicans still have a hefty majority. No wonder they feel like they don’t have to give much in negotiating with the president. The favored explanation for failing to take the House has been gerrymandering, but that’s only part of it, and knowing the problem isn’t the same as solving it. So OK, the House has been gerrymandered — that just means taking the House is tough. Doesn’t mean we don’t have to work on figuring out how to do it.

    Nor is that the only problem with the House. Republicans held an advantage even before the gerrymandering. If redistricting was strictly non-partisan and respected municipal boundaries, the simple fact of Democrats being concentrated in big cities and inner suburbs means it’s hard to divide us among districts that aren’t deeply blue, while Republicans’ preferences of outer suburbs and rural areas means there are plenty of ways to draw districts red enough to make them safe, but light red enough to leave enough Republicans for other districts. The effect is Republican seats are less safe than Democratic seats, but there are a lot more safe Republican seats.

    All that is even before incumbency which, judging by how House Democrats won by less than Obama, means some small, but big enough, percentage of voters voted for whoever was the incumbent. Not that I want to concede the Republicans get a permanent majority, but maybe the biggest challenge for Democrats is the job of trying to win without just waiting for the next redistricting — and even then, the election of the legislatures that will handle redistricting after the 2020 census will be elected under the current gerrymandered districts. If for no other reason than this, the GOP is far from dead. They simply don’t need majorities of voters to win majorities of seats.

    As long as I’ve brought up legislatures, let’s take them next. They’re just as gerrymandered as the House seats, and there’s the same problem of Democrats living in more densely populated areas that reduce their representation even without gerrymandering. We’re seeing that most of the damage Republicans are doing in the wake of the 2010 disaster is at the state level. Even if Democrats can take back governorships where Republicans have been stripping their opponents of their basic rights, that will just stop further damage. The Republicans look like they’ll keep holding enough legislative seats to stop the reassertion of rights or the overturning of any other noxious policies.

    In short, sorry to rain on our own parade, we have a massive problem with anything that’s districted. Even if I’m not persuasive that we have a problem at the presidential level, Congress and legislatures should be all the proof anyone needs that not only didn’t we win as big as we thought, but we have a bigger problem than can be solved by just waiting for demographic trends to solve our problem.

    The best plan clearly is to force Democrats to move out of cities to dilute the safely red seats. Who won’t be willing to move just to improve the odds of winning a legislative seat? OK, maybe there are flaws in that plan. We may just have to do better selling our ideas.

    Then there’s the money. Big billionaire money. We got a chuckle at how much the crank billionaires and dark money groups spent for so few victories, and it sounds like donors were pretty upset about losing the presidency, but that doesn’t mean their money meant nothing. How could Obama get such a narrow win against such a lousy candidate as Romney? Obama slightly outraised and outspent Romney, but the independent money was heavily Republican — maybe it did work. Maybe the big money was why Romney got as close as he did. Democrats defied the odds by picking up a couple Senate seats, which entailed winning close races, but maybe the money was why some winners barely won. Maybe the money spent down the ballot was an important reason Republicans held on to Congress and so many legislatures. We really don’t know how to measure it.

    Above all, maybe they spent their money inefficiently. Clearly efficiency isn’t the highest priority for people with unlimited funds, but still, they might get better at advertizing. I’d like to think, and I actually suspect, they hit ceilings in the effectiveness of TV ads. But maybe they’ll actually get better at it. That sort of money behind a better candidate than Romney is scary.

    Though to argue against my own point, it did occur to me tonight, when I heard someone who ran an independent group talk about how they can’t coordinate, I realized that while I doubt they don’t coordinate, the independent groups aren’t run by or accountable to the candidate’s campaign. With the GOP’s greater reliance on outside money, maybe that’s why they’ve become the less organized party. Could be all the nuts they’ve attracted too, but maybe the money being outside candidate or party control is part of their problem. If Romney had a message problem, maybe it was because too many people had partial control of the message.

    Speaking of Romney, don’t speak of Romney. I have to sympathize with reporters still assigned to cover him, but I don’t have to read them. Romney has no base. He generates no ideas. He’s not a candidate for anything in the future. Republicans don’t even like him. They just couldn’t find a decent candidate. Unless the topic is how the campaign was run, he just doesn’t matter. Pounding Romney became a habit from necessity, and maybe it’s hard to break, but he’s not worth our time anymore. His latest effort at pretending to be a real person might be amusing, but dwelling on it doesn’t flip votes any more. He’s a distraction for us. At this point, going after Mitt Romney is as useful as going after Thomas Dewey (“Dewey defeats Truman”). Focus instead on maximizing our advantages and minimizing theirs.

    Hmm, 51%-47%: All right, I admit it, I can’t resist the schadenfreude over Romney’s ironic 47%. His percentage is a bit more than that and has to be rounded, but still … tee hee.

    OK, back to work.

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    Let’s not totally despair about the U.S. House

    by Dan Burns on December 4, 2012

    In the total 2012 popular vote for candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, Democrats currently lead by a little over a million.  The final total will be just a bit higher.  Yet Republicans will likely end up with a 34 seat/17 vote advantage.  That’s because of wildly unrepresentative district gerrymandering, in the wake of the electoral disaster of 2010, especially in Ohio, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.

    Most of the reactions to the above, that I’ve seen, tend toward the range from bitter despair to sullen acceptance.  I prefer this.

    Democrats, though, are making a big mistake in attributing our failure solely to gerrymandering and essentially giving up on retaking the House the rest of this decade as many pundits are suggesting. I remember the same points being made after the 2002 and 2004 failures to retake the House, and in 2006 and 2008 we not only retook the House but added considerably to the margin in 2008.

    That’s from a fairly long essay, by online standards that is, but I recommend taking time to read it in full.  Sorry to be all trite, but the fact is, that the only sure thing is that simply dismissing the possibility of victory will lead to defeat.

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